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quoted shows that the difference here is not of quantity: *hanon* < *-onez, but *herzun* comes probably from a **hertonō* with short penultimate on the model of all the other trisyllabic forms, M. and N., of this declension; *-onō > *-onu > -un; for a different explanation of the form cf. Streitberg Ug. Gr., p. 259. The OHG. result of a form with long *o* in the penultima, corresponding to Goth. *hairtōna* is of course seen in the F.

In the paradigms of the adj. the "uninflected" forms are now properly put first. The reflexive *sih* is still denied d. value, (282n.1), *wānit sih* of Muspilli being taken as reflexive a., with ref. to Gebhardt's review of Schatz. The *gafregin* of the Wessobrunn Prayer is still described as an imitation of OE. *gæfrægn* (343n.7). Since the OHG. however surely spoke *gafreg(i)n ih* (cf. *meg ih*, etc., 26n.3), we need here account only for the phonetically accurate spelling: it is in this connection that the OE. form could plausibly be mentioned, though the isolated nature of the OHG. word would suffice. *gisa(a)z* 'sedet' of the Weissenburg Chatechism is explained (344n.3) as 'hat sich gesetzt': as this makes sense, the translator deserves some credit; but it is still highly probable that he mistook *sedet*, what with the surrounding verbs, for the perfect tense and then made the best of what seemed a queer passage: otherwise he would have written *sitzit*.

Though the new book makes a better appearance than the second edition, there are a few disturbing misprints, notably p. 20, l.5 from bottom: *weg, wego* with "umlaut" *e* instead of double-dotted "old" *e*; p. 42, l.2: for "§274" read "§271.4;" p. 43, l.9 read *tiufal*; p. 101, l.3: for *sūr* read *sār*; p. 177, l.3 read *smalenōz*; p. 229, l.10, read *sībene*; l.14 from bottom: for "289a" read "280a."

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INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY, by William Jerusalem. Translated by Charles F. Sanders. Macmillan, New York, 1910. Pp. x + 319.

Teachers of philosophy and all who have a general philosophical interest will welcome William Jerusalem's *Introduction to Philosophy* in its English dress. The extraordinary vogue of the book in Germany is indicated by the fact that four editions were called for within ten years. Those who recall that the author is the translator of James's *Pragmatism* into German, will come to the *Introduction* expecting much that is new and interesting, a standpoint different from the traditional school philosophy—nor will they be disappointed. America has at last come into her own, even in the recognition

of the nation that has long regarded philosophy as its own special vocation, and the frequent references in this book to James, Dewey, Baldwin and Pierce, indicate the remarkable change that has recently taken place. For the third edition of Jerusalem's *Einleitung*, which appeared in 1906, had none of these references. In 1906 William James was known in Germany primarily as a pedagogist—owing to the wide circulation of the translation of his *Talks to Teachers*,—secondarily as a psychologist, and not at all as a philosopher. The word Pragmatism carried no meaning, though in America, discussions about it had been raging for ten years, and the beginning of the new philosophy could, after all, be traced to Germany. It was in 1908, the year of the translation of James's *Pragmatism*, and of the International Congress of Philosophy at Heidelberg, that brought the sudden change; the year when the present, the fourth edition of this work appeared. And it is no accident that William Jerusalem, the psychologist and pedagogist should have been its leader.

The problem before one who would write an introduction to philosophy is far more difficult than that which is presented by an introduction to any other science. Objective treatment, clearness, and brevity are demanded. The two latter demands have seemed particularly difficult for philosophers; the first, almost impossible. Yet just these three characteristics are those which mark this book. That philosophy shall be both empirical and scientific, that in philosophy, clearness and profundity shall not be irreconcilable opposites, are the requirements which the author held before himself. And while justice is rendered to opposing doctrines and the big problems are not treated as settled, we are given a presentation of philosophy, not a christomathy of philosophies.

Logic and psychology are discussed as propaedeutic disciplines, and philosophy proper is divided in the customary way into theory of Knowledge, Metaphysics, Aesthetics and Ethics. The old classification is justified by the fact of the tripartite functioning of consciousness as cognition, feeling, and will, with Theory of Knowledge and Metaphysics as subdivisions of the philosophy of cognition, aesthetics as the philosophy of feeling, and ethics as the philosophy of the will. Throughout, the basis of the discussion is empirical and psychological, with emphasis on the social factors, which in the past have generally been ignored, except in ethics. In epistemology, critical idealism is shown to be an "hypertrophy of the cognitive impulse," which makes it imperative that we return to a commonsense view, and regard the world and its inhabitants as self-active, independent beings, whose existence is independent of the cognizing subject. The author's

own epistemology, approaches that of pragmatism—*genetic and biological epistemology*, he calls it. Knowledge issues from the impulse of self preservation, and through our central organization, the processes of our environment are changed from the language of nature into that of man. The fundamental form and primary conditions of all human knowledge are not transcendental, but fundamental apperceptions. Kant's discovery was really psychological and empirical.

In the chapter on Metaphysics especial attention is given to the views of Mach and Avenarius, as the type of monism, which, being empirical, comes nearest to solving the problem of the nature of reality. Here is one out of many indications of the newness and freshness of treatment which is presented so abundantly. But after all, the author's leanings are towards dualism. Mind and matter are too fundamentally unlike to be reconciled. A theistic interpretation is supported as best satisfying our demand for a total view of the universe after the analogy of our own fundamental apperception and will.

The greatest innovation for such a brief work is the amount of space given to aesthetics, and the fact of aesthetic taste is cited as the best proof that feeling is a distinct and fundamental function of consciousness. Aesthetics has been hitherto largely speculative and deductive; it is becoming genetic, biological and social. But as yet, the speculative method is not superseded with anything like the completeness that has taken place in psychology. It is to historical, experimental, and analytical methods, however, that we must look for the establishment of aesthetic law. Aesthetic pleasure is a distinct kind of functional delight, which is brought about by contemplation. The objects which incite this functional delight we style beautiful. Beauty is therefore relative,—different objects furnish functional delight to different individuals, to different periods, to different races. But there are works of art which have been characterized as beautiful for thousands of years, and by people of widely diversified characters, and we are justified in ascribing *objective beauty* to those productions because they tend to discharge functional pleasure in contemplation to multitudes of individuals. This is found especially true in works of art which represent that which is typical. Indeed, the presentation of the typical constitutes almost the essence of artistic production; and here we see the biological bearing of art; the idea of a type originates directly from the demands of life; is the antecedent of every abstract idea.

The sixth division of the book is devoted to ethics and sociology. That the two should thus be linked together, al-

ready gives the key-note of the discussion to follow. The treatment is genetic and sociological. Two psychological facts are found to be the basis of the moral life; moral judgment of the conduct of others, and conscience, the moral judgments before and after our own volitional choices. Moral judgment may be defined as the "evaluation of an act in its social significance." However, with the development of culture, the general disposition of the individual becomes of greater social significance than the particular act. As the full compliance with moral obligations depends not only on the good will of the individual, but in a large measure on the social order in which he lives, it becomes the duty of scientific ethics to examine the social order and see to what extent it is adapted to the true conditions of life. Thus ethics passes over into sociology.

Throughout the whole volume, the claims of philosophy as an independent and necessary science are vigorously defended, and the possibility of establishing a comprehensive theory of the universe vindicated; a theory which is harmonious and consistent; "*a world theory, moreover, which is adopted to satisfy the requirements of the understanding, and the demands of the heart.*"

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A CONCORDANCE TO BEOWULF, compiled by Albert S.

Cook, Professor of the English Language and Literature in Yale University. Halle, Max Niemeyer. 1911. Pp. 436.

The Beowulf is surely coming into its own. Every conceivable aspect of it has enlisted the attention of eager investigators, and such a vast mass of "literature" has gradually grown up around it, that an entirely complete bibliography, if not an impossibility, is to be counted anything but a *desideratum*. Now the venerable poem receives the singular distinction of the publishing of an excellent concordance, and it is a pleasure to note that this labor of love has been undertaken by the founder and president of the Concordance Society, who is also known as one of the most tireless workers in the field of Old English literature. Thus we are enabled to test in a practical way, in connection with our study of the Beowulf, the usefulness of this kind of compilation which was so eloquently set forth by Professor Cook (in 1906) in his address to the Modern Language Association of America (see *Mod. Lang. Notes* xxii, 33-35).

The word and phrase collection contained in this beautifully printed volume has been made strictly complete within certain limits. Excepting some of the commoner words, such